## Message Text

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**EXDIS** 

S/S FOR THE SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: NATO, PFOR, NAC, OVUP(KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJ: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER FRYDENLUND DEC 8

- 1. YOUR MEETING WITH FRYDENLUND TAKES PLACE AT A TIME WHEN THE NORWEGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER IS FACING CONSIDERABLE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES ESPECIALLY ON NORWAY'S RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. GIVEN FRYDENLUND'S HIGH PERSONAL REGARD FOR YOU, THE MEETING OFFERS A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO BOLSTER HIM IN HIS DIFFICULT DEALINGS WITH THE SOVIETS BY REASSURING HIM OF AMERICA'S CONTINUED COMMITMENT TO NORWAY.
- 2. FRYDENLUND'S DOMESTIC POSITION IS DIFFICULT. AS AN ABLE THOUGH UNINSPIRING, REPRESENTATIVE OF THE LABOR PARTY'S MODERATE WING, FRYDENLUND PRESENTS A TEMPTING TARGET TO THE PARTY'S LEFTISTS WHO WOULD

LIKE NORWAY TO PURSUE A "MORE INDEPENDENT" FOREIGN POLICY. SINCE YOU LAST SAW FRYDENLUND, THIS CRITICISM FROM THE LEFT HAS INCREASED AND EVEN SURFACED IN THE PRESS. RECENTLY, FOR EXAMPLE, THE OSLO LABOR YOUTH ORGAIIZATION ANNOUNCED ITS OPPOSITION TO FRYDENLUND'S REELECTION TO THE STORTING NEXT YEAR. AT THE SAME TIME, LAW OF THE SEA MINISTER EVENSEN, AN AGGRESSIVE AND AMBITIOUS LEFTIST SUSPECTED OF COVETING FRYDENLUND'S PORTFOLIO, HAS COURTED THE LEFT BY SUGGESTING THAT NORWAY'S NEW ECONOMIC RESOURCES WILL REQUIRE CHANGES IN HER FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICIES. THIS SNIPING FROM THE CONFIDENTIAL

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LEFT MAKES IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR

FRYDENLUND TO DEAL FIRMLY AND RESOLUTELY WITH HIS MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY

CONCERN--THE SOVIETS. FOR TO THE EXTENT THAT FRYDENLUND STANDS UP
TO THE SOVIETS. HE LEAVES HIMSELF OPEN TO ACCUSATIONS FROM THE LEFT THAT

HE IS "INCREASING TENSIONS" WITH NORWAY'S BIG NEIGHBOR, A CRITICISM TO

WHICH FRYDENLUND IS PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE IN AN ELECTION YEAR.

3. RELATIONS WITH USSR STRAINED. NORWAY'S RELATIONS WITH THE USSR HAVE DETERIORATED SINCE THE OSLO MINISTERIAL. AS THE NORWEGIANS HAVE TRIED TO STRENGTHEN THEIR ADMINISTRATION OF SVALBARD, THE SOVIETS HAVE

RESPONDED BY CONTINUING TO IGNORE NORWEGIAN REGULATIONS THERE AND BY INCREASING PRESSURE ON NORWAY IN THE BARENTS SEA. THE SOVIETS HAVE SO FAR TAKEN A RIGID POSITION ON THE CONTINENTAL SHELF TALKS AND

TO EMPHASIZE THEIR INTEREST IN THE AREA, HVE FIRED ROCKETS INTO THE DISPUTED AREA. THEY HAVE COMPLAINED ABOUT NORWEGIAN PRESS TREATMENT OF THE USSR WHILE DIRECTLY ATTACKING NORWEGIANS, IN AND OUT OF GOVERNMENT BY NAME IN THE SOVIET PRESS. AT THE SAME TIME, MOSCOW HAS TRIED TO COAX THE GON INTO ACCEPTING A BILATERAL CONSULTATIVE AGREEMENT BY MAKING IT A PRECONDITION FOR A VISIT BY GROMYKO TO OSLO. WHEN THE GON TURNED DOWN THIS REQUEST LAST WEEK, THE RUSSIANS TOLD THE NORWEGIANS THAT GROMYKO HAS A LIST OF 47 COUNTRIES TO VISIT NEXT YEAR, THE IMPLICATION BEING THAT IF FRYDENLUND WANTS TO HAVE GROMYKO VISIT OSLO (WHICH HE DOES), NORWAY WILL HAVE TO DO SOMETHING TO

PUT NORWAY HIGHER ON GROMYKO'S LIST. FRYDENLUND IS SOMEWHAT AT A LOSS AS TO HOW TO DEAL WITH THIS COMPLEX OF ISSUES WITH THE USSR.

4. FRYDENLUND COULD USE A LITTLE BUCKING UP. HE HAS GREAT RESPECT FOR YOU; HE ADMIRES YOUR ABILITY TO DEAL WITH THE SOVIETS; ANND HE WOULD APPRECIATE AND RESPECT ADIVCE YOU CAN GIVE HIM ON THIS SUBJECT. HE

WAS ENORMOUSLY APPRECIATIVE OF YOUR RECENT LETTER TO HIM ASSURING U.S. SUPPORT IN HIS DEALINGS WITH THE SOVIETS IN THE NORTH. BY ENCOURAGING HIM TO MAINTAIN A FIRM HAND AND NEGOTIATING POSITION ON THE

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NORTHERN ISSUES, YOU WOULD HELP HIM PERSONALLY AND STRENGTHEN OUR OWN AND ALLIED INTERESTS ON THE NORWERN FLANK.

5. IT WOULD BE MOST USEFUL IF YOU COULD PUT SOME OF THESE ISSUES INTO

A BROADER STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR FRYDENLUND. AND, AS YOU REVIEW THE COURSE OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, YOU COULD EMPHASIZE TO HIM OUR PERCEPTION THAT THE SOVIETS' CONSTANT STRATEGY HAS BEEN TO TRY TO SINGLE

OUT NORWAY, TO SPLIT IT OFF FROM ITS WESTERN ALLIES, USING CARROT AND STICK" TACTICS TO ACHIEVE THEIR ENDS. IT IS NOT A COMFORTABLE THOUGHT FOR FRYDENLUND, BUT NORWAY PROBABLY WILL HAVE TO RECONCILE ITSELF TO AN UNEASY, AND AT TIMES DIFFICULT, RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIETS FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

## 6. TALKING POINTS:

--WHEN DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS, THE NORWEGIANS SHOULD BE GUIDED BY A HARD AND REALISTIC APPRAISAL OF WHAT NORWAY' INTERESTS ARE. THEY SHOULD NOT PERMIT THEMSELVES TO BE INTIMIDATED BY THE SOVIETS' PREPONDERANT STRENGTH IN THE REGION. WE AND THE ALLIES STAND SIRMLY BEHIND NORWAY.

--WE WERE PLEASED TO HEAR THAT THE GON HAD TOLD THE SOVIETS THEY WERE NOT PREPARED TO ENTER INTO A CONSULTATIVE AGREEMENT. STILL, THE SIVIETS MAY WELL RAISE THE ISSUE AGAIN WHEN GROMYKO VISITS, PERHAPS PUTTING SIMILAR LANGUAGE INTO THEIR DRAFT COMMUNIQUE.

--WE ARE PLEASED THAT NORWAY IS TAKING STEPS TO STRENGTHEN ITS SOVEREIGNTY ON SVALBARD. ANY STEPS NORWAY MIGHT TAKE TO DILUTE ITS CONTROL (FYI WE UNDERSTAND THEY ARE CONSIDERING SOFTENING SOME ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS THERE IN HOPES OF WINNING SOVIET ACCEPTANCE TO THEM) SHOULD BE WEIGHTED AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD INTERPRET THEAT TO MEAN THAT NORWAY WILL DAVE UNDER INCREASED PRESSURE FROM THE USSR.

--WE ARE ENCOURAGED THAT NORWAY IS CONSIDERING A NON-DISCRIMINATORY FISHERY PROTECTION ZONE AROUND SVALBARD; SUCH A REGIME COULD HELP

GAIN ALLIED SUPPORT FOR NORWAY'S MANAGEMENT OF SVALBARD SHELF RESOURCES.

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--OUR OBJECTIVE REMAINS TO SET ASIDE LEGAL ARGUMENTS ON THESE ISSUES AND TO FIND WAYS TO BACK NORWAY'S SOVEREIGNTY ON SVALBARD. ANDERS

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